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New Solutions to the Age-Old Problem of Private-
Sector Bribery 
Sarah Clark*
Seedy, underhanded, illicit, illegal—just a small sample of 
countless adjectives that spring to mind with the mention of 
bribery. In both the public and private sectors, the presence of 
bribery “fosters a culture” of corruption, “moral ambivalence 
and reckless opportunism.”
 
1 After infiltrating private business-
es, bribery can increase costs of business and decrease moral 
and honest practices, but the potential for enormous gains from 
such an unfair advantage still entices individuals and busi-
nesses to pay bribes.2
A case study of Control Components, Inc. (CCI) under-
scores the excessive gains a company willing to commit bribery 
could achieve. From 2003 to 2007, CCI paid approximately 
$1.95 million in bribes to officers and employees of foreign pri-
vate companies.
 
3
 
*  J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2008, 
Franklin and Marshall College. The author thanks JaneAnne Murray for her 
encouragement and insightful comments; Staci Lieffring and the editors and 
staff of Minnesota Law Review for their hard work and diligence; and her fam-
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 Each payment’s sole purpose was to give CCI 
a competitive advantage through either increasing the number 
 1. Transparency Int’l, The Scale and Challenge of Private Sector Corrup-
tion, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2009: CORRUPTION AND THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR 3, 7 (2009), available at http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/ 
publications/doc/gcr/. 
 2. See David Hess, Corruption in the Value Chain: Private-to-Private and 
Private-to-Public Corruption, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2009, supra 
note 1, at 19, 22. 
 3. See Information at 3–4, United States v. Control Components, Inc., 
No. 8:09-cr-00162-JVS (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2009) (charging Control Compo-
nents, Inc. with one count of conspiracy and one count of violating the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act).  
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of contracts awarded to CCI or skewing competitive tenders fa-
vorably for CCI.4 As a direct result of these bribes, CCI pro-
duced a staggering $14.82 million in additional net profits from 
sales, to the detriment of any CCI competitor.5
Despite any inherent wrongfulness of CCI’s bribes, federal 
prosecutors could not, and still cannot, prosecute CCI for any of 
its bribes made to foreign private companies under the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, the main federal statute governing for-
eign bribery by American companies.
  
6 The Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA) prohibits payments or gifts by U.S. com-
panies or issuers to foreign public officials.7 Remarkably, the 
FCPA does not contain a corresponding provision for bribery 
between completely private entities.8
Private-sector bribery, also known as private-to-private or 
commercial bribery, is the lesser-known and prosecuted rela-
tion of public-sector bribery.
  
9 However, recent scandals, in-
creased deregulation, and the globalization of business have 
highlighted the need to take action against both public and pri-
vate bribery.10 To account for this need, the Department of Jus-
tice (DOJ) currently uses statutes outside the FCPA to prose-
cute private-sector bribery. The Travel Act, the “little brother” 
of the FCPA, and the mail and wire fraud statutes can individ-
ually, or as a tag-along to FCPA actions, prosecute all acts of 
bribery, whether public or private.11
Even though use of these statutes can supplement the 
FCPA’s private-bribery shortcomings, it is a makeshift, ineffi-
cient, and problematic solution. Since its enactment, the FCPA 
has “curtailed ‘business as usual’” for American companies pay-
ing bribes to foreign public officials.
  
12
 
 4. See Thomas R. Fox, Robert Kennedy, the Travel Act and the FCPA, 
FCPA COMPLIANCE & ETHICS BLOG (Jan. 11, 2010, 1:44 PM), http://tfoxlaw 
.wordpress.com/2010/01/11/robert-kennedy-the-travel-act-and-the-fcpa/. 
 Its power lies in its mono-
 5. See Information, supra note 3, at 4.  
 6. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2006). 
 7. See id. § 78dd-2(a).  
 8. See id. 
 9. Antonio Argandoña, Private-to-Private Corruption, 47 J. BUS. ETHICS 
253, 253–54 (2003).  
 10. Id. at 254.  
 11. See Fox, supra note 4.  
 12. NEAL ASBURY, CONSCIENTIOUS EQUITY 68 (2010). 
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lithic deterrent effect; from its widespread use in prosecuting 
foreign public bribery, American businesses understand that a 
FCPA prosecution can bring large fines and public notoriety.13 
Conversely, the DOJ must prosecute private foreign bribery 
through a patchwork of statutes.14 This system fails to provide 
the same coherent and intimidating basis to deter private brib-
ery.15 Until the DOJ can call upon a single, prominent statute 
to prosecute foreign private bribery, it will lack the ability to 
instill the same fear of prosecution as it can for public bribery 
under the FCPA.16
Not all countries use a roundabout method to prosecute 
private bribery. On July 1, 2011, the United Kingdom’s Bribery 
Act 2010 (U.K. Bribery Act) went into effect, rivaling the FCPA 
as the most severe anti-bribery statute in existence.
  
17 The U.K. 
Bribery Act bars bribery of both foreign officials and private 
companies and individuals.18 By encompassing all forms of cor-
porate bribery, the U.K. Bribery Act makes it clear to prosecu-
tors and businesses alike that committing acts of private brib-
ery is a serious offense.19
This Note argues that there is a need to reform current 
techniques of prosecuting foreign private bribery in the United 
States, as current methods are haphazard, confusing, and ne-
glect to take advantage of the symbolic power of the FCPA. 
Part I describes private-to-private bribery and the background 
of federal laws most associated with private bribery prosecu-
tions—the FCPA, the Travel Act, and the mail and wire fraud 
statutes. Part II elaborates on the strengths and weaknesses of 
private-sector bribery prosecution in the United States and the 
United Kingdom. Finally, Part III explains why the process to 
prosecute private-to-private bribery in the United States must 
be updated by amending the FCPA and highlights the U.K. 
 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Hess, supra note 2, at 23. 
 15. Id. (discussing how internationally, differing standards on private 
bribery detract from effective private-to-private corruption deterrence). 
 16. See id. 
 17. See Jonathan Russell, Fears Bribery Act Will Harm PLC, TELEGRAPH, 
Jan. 21, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/yourbusiness/bribery-act/ 
8272140/Fears-Bribery-Act-will-harm-UK-plc.html. 
 18. See id.  
 19. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 1 (U.K.). 
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Bribery Act as a model for reform. Despite existing statutes’ 
ability to supplement FCPA prosecutions, an FCPA that en-
compasses all forms of foreign bribery is the most efficient and 
fair way to eradicate corporate bribery. 
I.  REGULATING PRIVATE-SECTOR BRIBERY   
Despite the fact that the FCPA was enacted over thirty-five 
years ago, much confusion still exists as to who can be subject 
to a bribery prosecution in the United States. The FCPA only 
proscribes bribes paid to foreign officials by individuals and 
companies affiliated with the United States.20 Because the 
FCPA cannot prosecute foreign private-sector bribery, other 
federal statutes, self-regulation, and international legislation 
have attempted to fill the void.21
A. BRIBERY 
  
1. Bribery Defined  
Although it can take many shapes and forms, “[v]ery simp-
ly, a bribe is a payment made with an intention to corrupt the 
recipient, not for its own sake, but in the process of providing a 
good or service to the giver.”22 In other words, a bribe is a type 
of payment made to influence another to perform his or her du-
ties dishonestly.23 The bribe itself can span the gamut of a few 
dollars to “grease the wheels” of a business transaction to mil-
lions spent by corporations to obtain or maintain business 
deals.24 Bribery laws can criminalize either the giver of the 
bribe or the bribe recipient.25 Under American law, the giver of 
bribes traditionally faces prosecution.26
Bribery by corporations can be separated into two catego-
ries: public and private. Public-sector bribery, targeted by the 
FCPA, is the bribing of a foreign government official to obtain 
  
 
 20. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2006). 
 21. See Fox, supra note 4. 
 22. C. Gopinath, Recognizing and Justifying Private Corruption, 82 J. 
BUS. ETHICS 747, 748 (2008). 
 23. See id. 
 24. See Samart Powpaka, Factors Affecting Managers’ Decision to Bribe: 
An Empirical Investigation, 40 J. BUS. ETHICS 227, 227 (2002). 
 25. See id.  
 26. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (2006). 
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or retain business.27 In most cases, public-sector bribery is fair-
ly easy to recognize. Classic cases of public-sector bribery in-
clude illegal payments to government officials, often by compa-
nies attempting to expand into new foreign markets.28
Less frequently prosecuted, but equally as important to 
recognize, is private-sector bribery.
  
29 Private-sector bribery oc-
curs when a manager or employee who has power or responsi-
bility in a corporation acts contrary to his responsibilities and 
either “directly or indirectly harms the company or organiza-
tion, for his own benefit or for that of another person, company, 
or organization.”30 This type of bribery encourages a private-
sector employee to either act or refrain from acting, in breach of 
his or her required duties.31 An example of private-sector brib-
ery is a payment by a company manager to a distributor to ob-
tain a new distribution agreement or license.32
2. Effects of Public-Sector and Private-Sector Bribery 
 
In both the private and public sectors “[t]ransnational 
bribery . . . inhibits economic development and distorts compe-
tition. It disrupts distribution channels, destroys incentives to 
 
 27. See CRIMINAL DIVISION, DOJ & ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, SEC, A RE-
SOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012) [herein-
after FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ 
fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf. 
 28. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2; Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act in the Ultimate Year of its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 398 
(2010); see also Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 
in International Business Transactions, Nov. 21, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 
105-43 (1997) (requiring new signatory countries to recognize a definition of 
bribery of public officials similar to that in the FCPA). For a recent example of 
public-sector bribery, see Stephanie Clifford & David Barstow, Wal-Mart 
Takes a Broader Look at Bribery Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2012, at A1 (dis-
cussing the inquiry by Wal-Mart and the Justice Department on whether Wal-
Mart subsidiaries paid illegal bribes to gain better access to markets in  
Mexico). 
 29. See Gopinath, supra note 22, at 749. 
 30. See Argandoña, supra note 9, at 255.  
 31. See Memorandum from the International Chamber of Commerce to 
the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions 
§ 2 (Sept. 13, 2006) [hereinafter ICC Memorandum], available at http://www 
.iccwbo.org/Advocacy-Codes-and-Rules/Document-centre/2006/Memorandum-
to-the-OECD-Working-Group-on-Bribery-in-International-Business-
Transactions/. 
 32. See Argandoña, supra note 9, at 256. 
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compete on quality and price, undermines market efficiency 
and predictability,” and causes firms and countries to lose long-
term competitiveness.33
Within the public sector, bribery incentivizes governments 
to increase regulation and red tape. Although the bribe was 
originally intended to avoid unnecessary delays and costs, pay-
ing a bribe almost always leads to the need to pay more or 
higher bribes, entirely negating any attempt to “grease the 
wheels.”
  
34 Further, studies indicate that bribes are more likely 
to be taken in countries with a low per capita income.35 This, 
coupled with research indicating that corrupt countries are as-
sociated with lower levels of investment, productivity, growth, 
direct foreign investment, education spending, environment 
quality, and reduced appearance of governmental legitimacy,36 
demonstrates that bribery by businesses can deny impover-
ished nations the chance to have a minimal standard of living.37 
Additionally, these bribes can harm the payers’ home countries 
as safety and quality controls suffer when corrupt businesses 
attempt to make money as quickly as possible.38
While it is generally accepted that bribes cause social 
harm,
 
39
 
 33. See Powpaka, supra note 
 private-sector bribery in particular can cause negative 
24, at 227 (citation omitted). 
 34. Elizabeth Spahn, Nobody Gets Hurt?, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 861, 864–69 
(2010). 
 35. See Miriam F. Weismann, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: The 
Failure of the Self-Regulatory Model of Corporate Governance in the Global 
Business Environment, 88 J. BUS. ETHICS 615, 628 (2008). 
 36. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Law and Economics of Bribery and 
Extortion, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 217, 218 (2010); see also Randal C. 
Archibold, Even as It Hurts Economy, Bribery Is Taken in Stride, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 24, 2012, at A4 (discussing negative economic effects of overlooking pub-
lic-sector bribery in Mexico); Dev Kar, Mexico: Illicit Financial Flows, Macroe-
conomic Imbalances, and the Underground Economy, GLOBAL FINANCIAL IN-
TEGRITY (Jan. 2012), http://mexico.gfintegrity.org/en/ (summarizing the results 
of an economic study of Mexico that found that Mexico lost over $872 billion 
from 1970 to 2010 through illicit financial flows composed mainly of corrup-
tion, bribery, and kickbacks).  
 37. See James H. Davis & John A. Ruhe, Perceptions of Country Corrup-
tion: Antecedents and Outcomes, 43 J. BUS. ETHICS 275, 275–76 (2008). 
 38. See Spahn, supra note 34, at 892–98. 
 39. See Nancy Zucker Boswell, Combating Corruption: Focus on Latin 
America, 3 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 179, 180 (1996) (finding corruption, includ-
ing bribery, can have severe economic, political, and social costs). 
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economic, political, and commercial impacts in the countries 
where the bribe occurs.40 Private-sector bribery causes “signifi-
cant harm to society by distorting the marketplace.”41 In in-
stances of private-sector bribery, the action may appear to be a 
seemingly harmless hiring of a less qualified employee or the 
favoring of an inferior supplier.42 However, on a broad, interna-
tional scale, such actions in the aggregate degrade certainty 
and honesty in business, increasing transaction costs for all.43 
Employees from large companies can demand bribes or kick-
backs from potential suppliers, or even disguise bribes through 
inappropriate gifts and hospitality to clients.44 As such, private-
sector bribery, committed repeatedly, has the effect of eliminat-
ing the principles of merit-based selection and fair competition 
that are essential to the functioning of efficient markets.45 In 
fact, Transparency International’s 2011 Bribe Payers Index, 
which interviewed 3016 business executives across thirty coun-
tries, found that the perceived frequency of private-sector 
bribes was usually as high, if not higher than bribery of public 
officials, across all studied business sectors.46 The survey 
warned that without national legislation barring private-sector 
bribery, it will continue to affect entire supply chains, distort 
markets and competition, and penalize small businesses that 
cannot pay such bribes and those that simply refuse to do so.47
The recognition of the harms caused by private-sector brib-
ery to both the briber and the bribee is crucial. Private-to-
private bribery “undermines the smooth functioning and credi-
bility of free, open and global competition” by contributing to 
the cost of business and “penaliz[ing] loyal market partici-
 
 
 40. See Powpaka, supra note 24, at 227. 
 41. Hess, supra note 2, at 20.  
 42. See id. at 21 (citing the example of how bribery in supplier and sub-
contractor transactions can distort the bidding process and create strong in-
centives to pay bribes to remain competitive or gain information about compet-
itors’ bids). 
 43. See id. at 22. 
 44. See DEBORAH HARDOON & FINN HEINRICH, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, 
BRIBE PAYERS INDEX REPORT 2011, at 19 (2011), available at http://bpi 
.transparency.org/bpi2011/results/. 
 45. See Hess, supra note 2, at 22. 
 46. See HARDOON & HEINRICH, supra note 44, at 18–19. 
 47. See id. 
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pants.”48
B. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT  
 Recognizing the problems caused by private commer-
cial bribery, governments have attempted to criminalize such 
behavior. 
The mere whisper of a potential FCPA investigation causes 
terror to American companies transacting in international 
business.49 Calls for a statute like the FCPA began in the af-
termath of the Watergate scandal.50 In 1973, an investigator 
discovered that Gulf Oil and its Vice President had spent over 
$10 million from 1960 to 1973 “on illegal political activities and 
in business transactions abroad.”51 As disturbing as this discov-
ery was to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), it 
led to the question: how many other companies were participat-
ing in this same behavior?52 To answer this question, the SEC 
offered an amnesty program for corporations to self-report any 
similar payments by their own organization.53 With this poten-
tial reprieve from indictment, more than 400 companies report-
ed their practice of making payments to foreign officials, politi-
cal parties, and politicians, totaling over $300 million.54 
Realizing the systemic nature of these foreign political pay-
ments, Congress unanimously passed the FCPA in 1977.55
The FCPA has two principal mechanisms to deter bribery 
abroad: prohibiting payments to foreign officials and requiring 
strict corporate accounting and record-keeping practices.
 
56
 
 48. ICC Memorandum, supra note 
 Alt-
hough the accounting and record-keeping provisions are ex-
tremely important to ensure companies utilize proper account-
31, § 1. 
 49. See Jordan Weissmann, The Corruption Law That Scares the Bejesus 
out of Corporate America, ATLANTIC (Apr. 25, 2012, 5:08 PM), http://www 
.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/04/the-corruption-law-that-scares-the-
bejesus-out-of-corporate-america/256314/ (discussing how the FCPA “keeps 
corporate lawyers and c-suite executives tossing in their sleep”). 
 50. See Weismann, supra note 35, at 617. 
 51. Id.  
 52. See id.  
 53. See id. 
 54. See id.  
 55. See id.  
 56. See STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND 
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL NORMS 3–4 (2d ed. 2010). 
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ing controls,57 the anti-bribery provisions dominate most dis-
cussions of the FCPA.58 These anti-bribery provisions prohibit 
U.S. companies and their employees, U.S. citizens, foreign 
companies that list shares on a U.S. stock exchange or file re-
ports with the SEC, and any person within the United States 
from: “(i) corruptly paying, offering to pay, promising to pay, or 
authorizing the payment of money, a gift, or anything of value; 
(ii) to a foreign official; (iii) in order to obtain or retain busi-
ness.”59
Despite questions as to the FCPA’s efficacy,
  
60 or to its po-
tentially ambiguous language,61 the FCPA is clear in its pur-
pose to provide tough sanctions for those who commit foreign 
public-sector bribery abroad.62 Under the FCPA, criminal sanc-
tions for businesses could include fines up to $2,000,000.63 Indi-
viduals, officers, directors, stockholders, employees, and agents 
can face fines up to $100,000 and five years in prison.64 But, 
with the addition of the Alternative Fines Act, the fine could 
potentially rise to twice the benefit the defendant attempted to 
receive in paying the bribe.65 Additionally, the FCPA allows the 
DOJ to pursue civil remedies that can include sanctions on 
business entities and individuals of up to $16,000 per viola-
tion.66
 
 57. See id. at 41. 
 However, as the FCPA only applies to bribes of foreign 
 58. See id. at 7. 
 59. Koehler, supra note 28, at 389–90; see also Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2006) (FCPA anti-bribery provision). 
 60. See, e.g., Koehler, supra note 28, at 410–12 (noting that many FCPA 
enforcement actions are based on ambiguous or untested legal theories); 
Weismann, supra note 35, at 625–26 (finding that the FCPA’s reliance on 
mandatory self-regulation by corporations has failed, evidenced by recent, 
large-scale prosecutions). 
 61. See Dionne Searcey, But Who’s a ‘Foreign Official?’ FCPA to Get Key 
Test Next Month, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Feb. 22, 2011, 2:45 PM), http://blogs 
.wsj.com/law/2011/02/22/but-whos-a-foreign-official-fcpa-to-get-key-test-next-
month/ (noting that the term “foreign official” is ineffectively defined in the 
FCPA). 
 62. See Andre M. Penalver, Note, Corporate Disconnect: The Blackwater 
Problem and the FCPA Solution, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 459, 469–70 
(2010).  
 63. FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 27, at 68. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2006). 
 66. See FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 27, at 69. 
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officials,67
C. CURRENT METHODS TO PROSECUTE TRANSNATIONAL 
PRIVATE-SECTOR BRIBERY 
 the DOJ has had to use creative methods to prose-
cute foreign private-sector bribery.  
In an effort to find a way to prosecute foreign private-
sector bribery, the DOJ has turned to statutes not originally in-
tended for such a purpose. The Travel Act and the mail and 
wire fraud statutes permit the DOJ to rely on violations of state 
bribery laws and illegal uses of mail or interstate wire commu-
nications as the basis for federal private-sector bribery actions. 
Comparatively, in one all-encompassing statute, the U.K. Brib-
ery Act authorizes prosecutions of both public and private for-
eign bribery. Both the United States and the United Kingdom 
also attempt to encourage self-regulation of businesses as a 
means to supplement bribery laws.  
1. The Travel Act 
Notably, the DOJ has with increasing frequency joined 
Travel Act charges to FCPA actions to account for the FCPA’s 
inability to prosecute private-sector bribery.68 Enacted in 1961, 
the Travel Act’s original purpose was to “combat[] organized 
crime and racketeering by making illegal certain activities that 
extend across state and national borders.”69 A violation of the 
Travel Act essentially requires a two-step process by the DOJ: 
it must demonstrate that the activity meets the required ele-
ments in the Travel Act, as well as that it violates a separate 
state or federal law.70 Because of its organized crime origins,71
 
 67. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -2 (2006) 
(referring only to public-sector bribery). 
 
 68. See Samuel Rubenfeld, Law Firm: DOJ Increasingly Using Travel Act 
to Prosecute Commercial Bribery, WALL ST. J. CORRUPTION CURRENTS (Sept. 
28, 2010, 2:14 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2010/09/28/law 
-firm-doj-increasingly-using-travel-act-to-prosecute-commercial-bribery/. 
 69. Keith E. Henderson & Karen A. Guida, United States, in PRIVATE 
COMMERCIAL BRIBERY 479, 493 (Günter Heine et al. eds., 2003).  
 70. See, e.g., Stuart F. Pierson, The Travel Act: FCPA’s Sidekick Can Ride 
Alone—Globally, TROUTMAN SANDERS (Aug. 24, 2009), http://www 
.troutmansanders.com/08-24-2009/ (identifying the elements of the Travel Act 
and noting its increased use by the Justice Department in FCPA prosecu-
tions). 
 71. See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (noting that the 
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the Travel Act criminalizes only certain “unlawful activities,” 
including, among others, extortion, bribery, and arson.72
(a) traveled in or used the facilities of interstate commerce; (b) at-
tempted to or actually did promote, manage, establish, carry on, or fa-
cilitated the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying 
on . . . of . . . an unlawful activity . . . and (c) formed a specific intent 
to promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate one of the predi-
cate crimes.
 Be-
cause bribery is a covered “unlawful activity,” the federal gov-
ernment can prosecute foreign private-sector bribery under the 
Travel Act if it first proves that a person:  
73
Second, the federal government must also prove that the 
bribe violates a separate state or federal law that prohibits pri-
vate bribery.
 
74 Since no federal law specifically bars foreign pri-
vate-sector bribery, the United States government can only 
prosecute private-sector bribery under the Travel Act if the 
bribe violates a state law.75 In sum, to bring a Travel Act action 
for foreign bribery, a federal prosecutor must show that a per-
son committed a predicate violation of state law, and that the 
bribery was committed intentionally by travelling in or using 
some facility of interstate commerce. Currently, at least twen-
ty-nine states have laws against private commercial bribery.76
While using state laws to serve as a predicate for Travel 
Act violations is not a novel approach, the use of the Travel Act 
as a tag-along to FCPA indictments is a new and increasing 
  
 
Travel Act was “one of many bills enacted by the 87th Congress” that ad-
dressed organized crime). 
 72. Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2006). 
 73. Henderson & Guida, supra note 69, at 493–94. 
 74. See Travel Act § 1952(b); see also Richard L. Cassin, Prosecuting Pri-
vate Overseas Corruption, FCPA BLOG (Aug. 10, 2009, 8:02 PM), http:// 
fcpablog.squarespace.com/blog/tag/private-overseas-bribery (using a case study 
to explain the process and restrictions of Travel Act actions). 
 75. See Richard L. Cassin, We Repeat, It’s the Travel Act, FCPA BLOG 
(May 4, 2011, 6:49 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/5/4/we-repeat-its 
-the-travel-act.html (noting that state laws prohibiting bribery to private par-
ties are “enough to support a Travel Act charge in a federal prosecution”). 
 76. See John P. Rupp & David Fink, Foreign Commercial Bribery and the 
Long Reach of U.S. Law, BLOOMBERG L. REP.—CORP. & M&A L., Jan. 2012, at 
1, 2 (2012), available at http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/6f93a9ee-340d 
-49b3-83fe-252d3ddc8ced/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/5af5fff4-f264 
-42f2-aace-2781d6869cd9/Foreign_Commercial_Bribery_and_the_Long_ 
Reach_of_U.S._Law.pdf. 
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trend.77 On July 31, 2009, the DOJ announced that Control 
Components Inc. (CCI), a California company that designs and 
manufactures valves, had pled guilty to violations of the FCPA 
and the Travel Act.78 The DOJ found that CCI had participated 
in “a decade-long scheme to secure contracts in approximately 
thirty-six countries by paying bribes to officials and employees 
of various foreign state-owned companies as well as foreign and 
domestic private companies.”79 The DOJ’s press release specifi-
cally noted that CCI had made corrupt payments to “officers 
and employees of state-owned and privately-owned customers 
around the world, including in China, Korea, Malaysia and the 
United Arab Emirates, for the purpose of obtaining or retaining 
business for CCI.”80 In CCI’s case, its private-sector bribery vio-
lated California law, which formed the basis for the Travel Act 
indictment by the DOJ.81
In United States v. Carson,
 By bringing a Travel Act action 
against CCI, the DOJ demonstrated its enthusiasm to prose-
cute both public and private foreign bribery.  
82 the DOJ brought FCPA and 
Travel Act charges against six executives of CCI, including 
Stuart Carson, CEO of CCI, and his wife, Hong “Rose” Carson 
(the Carson defendants).83 Challenging the Travel Act indict-
ments, the Carson defendants brought one of the first legiti-
mate challenges to the application of the Travel Act to private 
foreign bribery by claiming, among other things, that the Trav-
el Act does not apply extraterritorially.84
 
 77. See Cassin, supra note 
 In disagreeing with 
75 (noting the increase of Travel Act charges in 
FCPA cases in recent years). 
 78. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Control Components Inc. Pleads 
Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges and Agrees to Pay $18.2 Million Criminal 
Fine (July 31, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/July/09 
-crm-754.html. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.  
 81. See Cassin, supra note 74. 
 82. United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-cr-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 
7416975 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011). 
 83. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Six Former Executives of Califor-
nia Valve Company Charged in $46 Million Foreign Bribery Conspiracy (Apr. 
8, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/April/09-crm-322 
.html. 
 84. See Richard L. Cassin, Carson Case Tests the Travel Act, FCPA BLOG 
(Aug. 10, 2011, 7:28 AM), http://fcpablog.squarespace.com/blog/2011/8/10/ 
carson-case-tests-the-travel-act.html. 
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the Carson defendants, Judge James Selna found that, alt-
hough this case did not require Travel Act could be applied ex-
traterritorially.85 In his order, Judge Selna commented on fu-
ture use of the Travel Act in foreign private bribery cases by 
stating that “criminal statutes may apply extraterritorially 
even without an explicit Congressional statement . . . . The 
Court agrees with the Government that ‘plain language of the 
Travel Act demonstrates Congress’s desire to reach conduct 
overseas.’”86
Another Travel Act prosecution involved Nexus Technolo-
gies, a Pennsylvania-based corporation.
 Although yet to be tested by other judicial districts, 
the Central District of California has seemingly cemented the 
government’s ability to use the Travel Act as a tool in prosecut-
ing international private-sector bribery.  
87 In Nexus Technolo-
gies’ case, three sibling executive employees were charged with 
knowingly and willfully using a facility in foreign commerce 
with the intent to commit bribery in violation of Pennsylvania 
law.88 Two of the sibling defendants, Nam Nguyen and his 
brother An, pled guilty to a violation of the Travel Act in con-
nection with “commercial bribes, and money laundering”89 and 
consequently received prison sentences.90
 
 85. See Carson, 2011 WL 7416975, at *6–7, *12 (denying defendants’ mo-
tion to dismiss). The court noted that, if it had needed to, it could apply the 
Travel Act extraterritorially as the “nature of the offense expressly contem-
plates foreign conduct.” Id. at *7–8 (internal quotations omitted). As support, 
the court compared the congressional intent of applying the Travel Act abroad 
to the intent of applying the FCPA abroad. Id. at *8. 
 The cases against 
CCI and Nexus Technologies demonstrate the DOJ’s willing-
 86. Id. at *6–7 (internal citations omitted).  
 87. See Superseding Indictment at 24, United States v. Nexus Techs., Inc., 
No. 2:08-cr-00522-TJS (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2009). 
 88. See id. 
 89. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former Nexus Technologies Inc. Em-
ployees and Partner Sentenced for Roles in Foreign Bribery Scheme Involving 
Vietnamese Officials (Sept. 16, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
pr/2010/September/10-crm-1032.html. 
 90. See Richard L. Cassin, Four Sentenced for Vietnam Graft, FCPA BLOG 
(Sept. 16, 2010, 11:04 AM), http://fcpablog.squarespace.com/blog/2010/9/16/ 
four-sentenced-for-vietnam-graft.html. Violating the Travel Act can lead to a 
sentence of up to five years in prison, a fine, or both; multiple Travel Act viola-
tions could warrant prosecution under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO). See Rupp & Fink, supra note 76, at 2. 
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ness to attempt to find a way to remedy the FCPA’s inability to 
prosecute acts of foreign private-sector bribery. 
2. Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes 
The mail91 and wire fraud statutes,92 and the honest ser-
vices law,93 which amends the mail and wire fraud statutes, 
apply to cases of foreign private-sector bribery. The mail and 
wire fraud statutes “make it a crime to devise a scheme to de-
prive another of the right of honest services” through the use of 
mail, wire, radio, or television communications.94 Both statutes 
use the phrase “fraudulent scheme,” which is very broad and 
includes bribery.95 As such, these statutes are used with great 
frequency in today’s global market, as it is virtually impossible 
to do business without using interstate or international mail or 
wire communications, such as telephone calls, facsimiles, or 
sending letters and packages.96 The elements of each statute 
are almost identical, except for the difference in the trigger in-
strument (whether through use of the mails or wires) and the 
fact that the wire fraud act requires a communication to cross 
state lines.97 Also, to fall under the scope of the mail and wire 
fraud statutes, a prosecutor does not need to prove an underly-
ing crime;98 a defendant does not need to personally wire or 
mail a letter containing a bribe, but only cause the interstate 
mailing or wire communication.99
 
 91. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). 
 The ease in proving such a 
violation makes the mail and wire fraud acts a “federal prose-
 92. See id. § 1343. 
 93. See id. § 1346. 
 94. David M. Howard et al., Private Commercial Bribery: The Next Wave 
of Anti-Corruption Enforcement?, DECHERT ON POINT (Dechert LLP), Apr. 
2010, at 4 (citing United States v. Sancho, 157 F.3d 918, 920 (2d Cir. 1998)), 
available at http://www.dechert.com/files/Publication/06d068f9-52ef-4c4e-a956 
-44345cb1a4b1/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/9e04f35f-aeae-4418-95a8-
4eae8ae3e5cb/White_Collar_SA_04-10_Private_Commercial_Bribery.pdf. 
 95. Commercial Bribery, EXECUTIVE LEGAL SUMMARY 54 (2012), available 
at Westlaw EXECLSUM. 
 96. See DAN K. WEBB ET AL., CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS 
§ 2.03 (2004) (noting “[i]t is difficult to imagine a commercial transaction to-
day” that does not involve these communication methods). 
 97. See id.  
 98. See Commercial Bribery, supra note 95. 
 99. See WEBB ET AL., supra note 96, at § 2.03, 2-9. 
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cutor’s ‘true love,’ because they provide a basis for criminal lia-
bility in a broad spectrum of instances.”100
In 1988, Congress amended and enlarged these already 
wide-reaching statutes through enactment of the honest ser-
vices amendment.
  
101 Originally, its language encompassed any 
“scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of 
honest services,”102 which greatly expanded public officials and 
business professionals’ potential for liability under the mail 
and wire fraud acts.103 The amendment aimed to criminalize 
any situation where a fiduciary deprived a person they were in 
a fiduciary relationship with of “honest services.”104 This would 
include situations involving private actors paying bribes that 
were not otherwise covered in other federal bribery statutes 
(like the FCPA that only applied to public officials).105
 
 100. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40852, DEPRIVATION OF 
HONEST SERVICES AS A BASIS FOR FEDERAL MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD CONVIC-
TIONS 1 (2010).  
 However 
in 2010, the Supreme Court found such a broad interpretation 
unconstitutionally vague, and subsequently narrowed the hon-
est services amendment to only situations where a fiduciary 
 101. Act of Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 
4508 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006)). Prior to McNally v. United States, 
circuit courts allowed a broad reading of the mail statute to include the right 
to honest services, in addition to deprivations of money or property, within “a 
scheme or artifice to defraud.” See Margaret Ryznar, The Honest-Services Doc-
trine in White-Collar Criminal Law, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 83, 87–88 (2011). Af-
ter the decision in McNally pared back the mail fraud statute to include only 
deprivations of money or property, Congress passed the honest services 
amendment to once again allow a “scheme or artifice” to defraud to include the 
right to honest services. See id. at 88. 
 102. See DOYLE, supra note 100, at 5 (emphasis omitted). 
 103. See Ryznar, supra note 101, at 88. 
 104. See Paul M. Kessimian, Note, Business Fiduciary Relationships and 
Honest Services Fraud: A Defense of the Statute, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
197, 211. Such a broad reading of the mail and wire fraud acts caused signifi-
cant outcry when prosecutors tested the outer limits of the statutes prior to 
amendment; one such case involved a lawyer convicted of mail fraud for 
breaching his duty of loyalty to the firm’s clients. See Ryznar, supra note 101, 
at 87. 
 105. See Ryznar, supra note 101, at 84 (noting that prosecutors used the 
honest services amendment to prosecute individuals in both the public and 
private sectors). Over time, the honest services amendment has applied to cor-
porate officers, purchasing agents, stockbrokers, and others in the private sec-
tor who owe “clear fiduciary duties to their employees or unions.” McNally v. 
United States, 483 U.S. 350, 363 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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deprives a person of “honest services” through a bribery or 
kickback scheme.106 Despite its narrowing by the Supreme 
Court, the honest services amendment should still apply to acts 
of private sector bribery, as bribery and kickback schemes di-
rectly limit a victim’s right to have honest services from an offi-
cial or employee.107
Additionally, to ensure that the government can prosecute 
international private-sector bribery, the Supreme Court has 
upheld application of the mail and wire fraud statutes extrater-
ritorially.
 
108 With their adaptability to most instances of crimi-
nal fraud and the assurance under the honest services amend-
ment that they are applicable to bribery and kickback schemes 
in the private-sector, the mail and wire fraud statutes can be 
used to supplement FCPA actions and are “frequently . . . the 
sole instrument of justice that could be wielded against the ev-
er-innovative practitioners of deceit.”109
3. Corporate Self-Regulation 
  
Another technique used in the United States to combat for-
eign bribery, either by design or due to a previous lack of un-
derstanding as to the implications of foreign private-sector 
bribery, is corporate self-regulation.110
 
 106. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931–34 (2010). A prac-
tical example of using an honest services violation to bring a mail or wire 
fraud statute action is when a corporate officer or employee acts against their 
company’s best interests to pursue a self-interested transaction, and in doing 
so, uses the mail or some form of wire communication. See DOYLE, supra note 
 Many companies prefer 
100, at 6–7. (quoting United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 126–27 (2d. Cir. 
2003) (en banc)). In this instance, the DOJ would be able to supplement a 
FCPA action with either the mail or wire fraud statute and bring charges for 
private-sector bribery. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 107. See DOYLE, supra note 100, at 17 (citations omitted) (noting that Con-
gress intended to reach fraud and kickback schemes by protecting that “intan-
gible right to honest services”). 
 108. See Howard et al., supra note 94, at 4 (citing Pasquantino v. United 
States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005)). Although not specifically applying the mail and 
wire fraud statutes extraterritorially, the Pasquantino Court noted in dicta 
that the statutes’ language was surely not intended to have “only domestic 
concerns in mind.” Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 371–72 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 109. WEBB ET AL., supra note 96, at § 2.03, 2-8 (quoting Jed S. Rakoff, The 
Federal Mail Fraud Statute, Part 1, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 772 (1980)). 
 110. See Argandoña, supra note 9, at 253–54. 
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to self-police internal acts of bribery, thus avoiding high legal 
costs and the imposition of government in business affairs.111 
Self-regulation is a fairly controversial method, as it relies on 
the would-be-perpetrators (or their companies) of the bribery to 
enact and enforce corporate governance guidelines to eradicate 
bribery issues.112
Advocates of using internal corporate regulation to police 
bribery argue that the private sector is more efficient than out-
side actors at regulating itself.
 The effectiveness of self-regulation can gener-
ally be viewed on a spectrum from completely ineffective to a 
good supplement to existing criminal and civil bribery statutes. 
113 As support, advocates argue 
that: (1) corporations have a vested interest in self-preservation 
and will stop employees from taking actions that could harm 
the business; (2) there are few incentives for this type of behav-
ior as competitive markets eventually penalize inefficient be-
havior; and (3) private-sector bribery inherently has less of an 
economic, social, and ethical impact than public-sector bribery 
as it does not involve the corruption of public officials.114 Also, 
critics of bribery statutes believe that bribery actions create an 
enormous boon for government agencies and specialized law 
firms and waste corporate resources on mandated DOJ investi-
gations that could be more effectively used if companies self-
regulated.115
Some critics go so far as to advocate no governmental regu-
lation of bribery whatsoever. Opponents of statutes like the 
FCPA argue that bribery is an unavoidable cost of business in 
international business transactions and that bribery prosecu-
tions hinder American companies who can no longer adequately 
compete abroad.
  
116
 
 111. See id. at 259. 
 The main arguments against governmental 
regulation of bribery, especially in an international business 
 112. See Gopinath, supra note 22, at 749 (noting that even though some 
corporations have enacted ethics codes and training programs to combat cor-
ruption, “the practice of private corruption continues to exist”). 
 113. See Argandoña, supra note 9, at 253. 
 114. See id. at 253–54. 
 115. See Nathan Vardi, The Bribery Law Racket, FORBES, May 24, 2010, at 
70, 72 (noting that “a thriving and lucrative anti-bribery complex has 
emerged” but questioning “[w]hether it’s having any impact on reducing brib-
ery”). 
 116. See Spahn, supra note 34, at 862. 
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context, are that bribes are necessary to “grease[] the wheels of 
excessive government regulation,” that they do not cause per-
sonal harm to individuals, that they can actually be a benefit to 
spurring new business, and that bribes are simply a practical 
business measure, utilized by numerous companies.117 Addi-
tionally, business leaders argue that FCPA prosecutions create 
a “lopsided playing field” for American businesses that have to 
compete with international companies not hindered by strin-
gent bribery laws.118
However, such arguments against any monitoring of brib-
ery are outweighed by the acceptance that bribery creates prob-
lems and causes strong negative societal implications, and, as 
such, should be eliminated.
  
119
4. United Kingdom’s Bribery Act 2010 
 Despite arguments in the United 
States about how to go about such monitoring and regulation, 
the United Kingdom has recently taken an extremely proactive 
and definitive approach to prosecuting foreign private-sector 
bribery. 
In contrast to the multi-statute approach used to prosecute 
bribery in the United States, the United Kingdom’s Bribery Act 
2010 explicitly makes illegal the bribery of public officials and 
private businesses by companies or individuals,120 domestically 
and internationally.121 The United Kingdom passed the U.K. 
Bribery Act in response to criticism that its then-existing brib-
ery laws were inadequate to prosecute newer and more intri-
cate forms of bribery and that they were difficult to apply in 
practice.122
 
 117. Id. 
  
 118. Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 83, 89 (2007). 
 119. Id. at 254.  
 120. See Eric Engle, I Get by with a Little Help from My Friends? Under-
standing the U.K. Anti-Bribery Statute, by Reference to the OECD Convention 
and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 44 INT’L LAW. 1173, 1173 (2010). 
 121. See Arvinder Sambei, The U.K. Bribery Act 2010: An Overview, 27 
INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 803, 803 (2011). 
 122. See Joseph Warin et al., The British Are Coming!: Britain Changes Its 
Law on Foreign Bribery and Joins the International Fight Against Corruption, 
46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 4–5 (2010) (noting that “[l]ittle had changed in [the prior] 
legal framework during the last ninety years”).  
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Before the enactment of the U.K. Bribery Act, the United 
Kingdom did not have a comprehensive statute proscribing 
bribery or corruption.123 Now, immediately in Section 1, the 
U.K. Bribery Act states that it is an offense for a person to in-
duce or reward a person to bring about an improper perfor-
mance in their relevant professional function.124 Using inten-
tionally vague language—referring simply to a “person” and to 
“improper performance”—the U.K. Bribery Act ensures that 
“bribery in both the public and private sectors is covered.”125 
These revisions have arguably allowed the U.K. Bribery Act to 
surpass the FCPA in aggressiveness to eliminate bribery.126
Revising its bribery statutes was a bold step for the United 
Kingdom as it clearly branched away from the FCPA’s system 
of only targeting bribery of public officials. The United King-
dom took an opportunity in updating its bribery laws to use 
FCPA language and ideas, while also making a clear statement 
to businesses that private bribery would not be tolerated. In 
recognizing the ineffectiveness of its previous patchwork sys-
tem of prosecuting bribery,
 
127 the United Kingdom passed a 
single comprehensive piece of bribery legislation to provide 
prosecutors with the necessary tools to work toward eradicating 
all forms of bribery.128
The United States and the United Kingdom have different 
techniques to combat the increasingly prevalent and recognized 
issue of foreign private-sector bribery. The DOJ currently uti-
lizes pre-existing statutes to supplement the FCPA’s inability 
to prosecute private-sector bribery. On the other hand, the 
United Kingdom created the U.K. Bribery Act, to encompass all 
bribery offenses within a single statute. Each technique can 
eventually reach the result of prosecuting international pri-
vate-sector bribery, but their separate processes can make all 
the difference in the effectiveness of such a prosecution.  
 
 
 123. See id. at 5. 
 124. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRIBERY ACT 2010 GUIDANCE 10 (2011). 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Margaret Ryznar & Samer Korkor, Anti-Bribery Legislation in the 
United States and United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis of Scope and Sen-
tencing, 76 MO. L. REV. 415, 420 (2011). 
 127. See Warin et al., supra note 122, at 4–5. 
 128. See Ryznar & Korkor, supra note 126, at 420. 
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II.  CRITIQUING CURRENT METHODS USED TO 
ERADICATE PRIVATE BRIBERY   
Each method used to prosecute or correct instances of pri-
vate-sector foreign bribery in the United States is an attempt 
at supplementing the FCPA. However, since each option is a 
“fix” rather than a full solution to eliminate foreign private-
sector bribery, each is inferior to an amended FCPA that en-
compasses all forms of foreign bribery. While the Travel Act 
and mail and wire fraud statutes are capable of prosecuting 
foreign bribery if the action violates a state private bribery law 
or is an illegal use of interstate mail or wire communication, 
these laws require cumbersome additional hurdles for the DOJ. 
Also, while reliance on self-governance by private companies as 
a means to combat private-sector bribery requires few re-
sources, it is not a reliable stand-alone method. Finally, all of 
these supplemental prosecutorial methods fail to take ad-
vantage of the arresting intimidation and public awareness in-
herent in FCPA actions. As such, the U.K. Bribery Act’s meth-
od to combine into one, forceful statute the means to prosecute 
both public and private bribery is the best way to ensure all 
forms are bribery are effectively discouraged and efficiently 
prosecuted.  
A. CURRENT TECHNIQUES IN THE UNITED STATES 
1. The Travel Act 
As no federal statute specifically outlaws the bribing or re-
ceiving of bribes in private business settings, the Travel Act is 
an important way for the DOJ to supplement FCPA actions and 
prosecute foreign commercial bribery.129
The Travel Act criminalizes “extortion, bribery, or arson in 
violation of the laws of the State in which committed or of the 
United States.”
 However, the benefit of 
being able to rely on a statute outside the FCPA to prosecute 
private-sector bribery is also the Achilles’s heel of prosecuting 
private bribery under the Travel Act.  
130
 
 129. Jeffrey J. Ansley et al., Commercial Bribery and the New International 
Norms, BLOOMBERG L. REP., Sept. 2009, available at http://works.bepress.com/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=don_berthiaume. 
 Since neither the FCPA, nor any other feder-
 130. Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b) (2006). 
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al statute specifically criminalizes private-sector bribery, Trav-
el Act actions must rely on state laws as the necessary predi-
cate statute.131 Currently, there are at least twenty-nine states 
with bribery statutes that deal either directly with or are gen-
eral enough to include private commercial bribery.132 Regretta-
bly for the DOJ, the remaining states likely lack the predicate 
statute needed to bring a Travel Act action and the twenty-nine 
states that do have private bribery statutes greatly vary on the 
sentences imposed for a violation.133
Such a system of disparate applicability can appear simul-
taneously unfair and confusing. For instance, if the private 
commercial bribery is committed in Idaho, where there is no 
predicate state private bribery law, there could be no Travel 
Act action and the potential defendant seemingly gets away (at 
least regarding a federal prosecution) “scot-free.” However, if 
the private bribery took place in California, the location of 
CCI’s predicate Travel Act prosecution, a defendant could face 
a state penalty of imprisonment in the county jail for one year 
if the bribe is $1000 or less, or imprisonment in a county jail or 
state prison for sixteen months to three years for bribes over 
$1000.
  
134 In Minnesota, if the bribe is for $500 or more, the con-
victed defendant would face state sanctions of up to five years 
in prison and a fine of $10,000.135 Additionally, the Travel Act 
imposes a range of penalties based on the severity of the viola-
tion, from a sentence of no more than five years to life impris-
onment, on top of what a defendant would face under state 
law.136
 
 131. See generally Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 
(2006). 
 One can imagine, given the variety of potential penal-
 132. Rupp & Fink, supra note 76, at 2 n.11 (noting these states include Al-
abama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, 
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mis-
sissippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
and Washington). 
 133. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 641.3(c) (West 2010), with MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 609.86, subdiv. 3(1) (West 2012) (illustrating how states handle foreign 
private bribery sentencing’s differently).  
 134. See PENAL § 641.3(c). 
 135. See § 609.86, subdiv. 3(1). 
 136. See 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3)(A) to (B) (2006). 
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ties, the difficulties in maintaining uniform federal prosecu-
tions of private commercial bribery in the United States.  
One of the greatest hindrances of the Travel Act becoming 
an effective anti-bribery tool is the fact that many businesses 
are unaware of its existence. Although prosecutions for Travel 
Act violations are increasing,137 U.S. authorities still tend not to 
bring private-sector bribery charges unless they relate to a 
larger public-sector bribery prosecution or if prosecutors believe 
a successful FCPA action is improbable.138 The fact that the 
Travel Act relies on varied state laws contributes to this issue, 
as does the Travel Act’s muted origins and lack of judicial in-
put.139 Due to the FCPA’s widespread recognition in the busi-
ness sphere, many companies have in place strict measures to 
ensure compliance.140 But, unlike the FCPA, the Travel Act was 
not enacted following a watershed investigation, nor was it 
even created to prosecute private bribery.141 In this way, the 
Travel Act lacks the immense publicity the FCPA had upon its 
enactment, and with the current lack of public Travel Act pros-
ecutions,142
Proponents of the Travel Act point to the success of Travel 
Act tag-along actions to FCPA prosecutions.
 its threat to companies as a private-sector bribery 
statute will remain hidden until it garners the same awareness 
as FCPA actions.  
143 As noted earlier, 
in July 2009, Control Components Inc. pleaded guilty to viola-
tions of the FCPA and the Travel Act.144
 
 137. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 
 Additionally, in Sep-
tember 2010, Nexus Technologies Inc. and two of its executives 
78. 
 138. See Rupp & Fink, supra note 76, at 2. 
 139. See Barry J. Pollack & Laura Billings, After 30 Years of the FCPA, 
Will Courts Finally Get into the Act?, 34 CHAMPION 34, 34 (2010) (“[O]nly a 
handful of FCPA cases have actually been litigated.”). 
 140. See Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L 
L. 907, 1004 (2010). 
 141. See Rupp & Fink, supra note 76, at 1 (identifying the original purpose 
of the Travel Act as “combat[ting] organized crime”). 
 142. See id. (stating that “foreign commercial bribery is not yet a primary 
focus of U.S. enforcement activity”). 
 143. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 78 (discussing 
Control Components, Inc.’s guilty plea to both FCPA and Travel Act viola-
tions). 
 144. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 78. 
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pleaded guilty to FCPA and Travel Act violations.145 However, 
these successes for the DOJ do not necessarily speak to the effi-
cacy of the Travel Act, but rather companies’ fear of FCPA ac-
tions.146
Since the FCPA’s inception, most companies have chosen to 
settle pre-indictment or immediately after a FCPA indictment 
by the DOJ.
 
147 If a company is one of the few not offered a non-
prosecution agreement (NPA) or a deferred prosecution agree-
ment (DPA) pre-indictment, then it will likely agree to the DOJ 
filing a criminal information that is then resolved by a plea 
agreement.148 For corporations, settling pre-indictment is cru-
cial to avoiding the “potential downside of litigation.”149 By set-
tling, companies avoid “bad press and a subsequent stock de-
valuation” that would almost definitely result from a 
prosecution.150 In fact, in the FCPA’s history, only two compa-
nies have attempted to defend FCPA charges and “put the DOJ 
to its high burden of proof at trial.”151
 
 145. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 
 As more Travel Act pri-
89.  
 146. See Mike Emmick, The Travel Act—The FCPA’s Red-Haired Stepchild, 
THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Feb. 1, 2012), http://newsandinsight 
.thomsonreuters.com/New_York/Insight/2012/02_-_February/The_Travel_Act_ 
%E2%80%93_The_FCPA_s_red-haired_stepchild/ (warning companies to not 
prematurely celebrate when internal investigations reveal no bribes to foreign 
officials and to not forget the Travel Act); see also Rupp & Fink, supra note 76, 
at 2 (questioning whether the U.S. government would have even pursued 
Travel Act charges in the Control Components case absent public-sector brib-
ery). 
 147. See Pollack & Billings, supra 139, at 34. 
 148. See FCPA 101, FCPA PROFESSOR, http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa 
-101 (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). See generally Allen R. Brooks, Comment, A 
Corporate Catch-22: How Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements Impede 
the Full Development of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 7 J.L. ECON. & 
POL’Y 137, 153 (2010) (DPAs and NPAs are alternatives to litigation, as a 
prosecutor can “forgo a trial in exchange for an agreement that punishes, de-
ters, and rehabilitates a defendant.”). DPAs first require that formal charges 
are filed, whereas under an NPA a defendant may escape the filing of any 
formal charges. Id. 
 149. See Pollack & Billings, supra note 139, at 34. 
 150. Evan P. Lestelle, Comment, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Inter-
national Norms of Foreign Public Bribery, and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 
83 TUL. L. REV. 527, 529 (2008). 
 151. See FCPA 101, supra note 148 (“In 1991, Harris Corporation (and cer-
tain of its executives) prevailed in an FCPA trial when a federal court judge 
granted a verdict of acquittal . . . . In 2011, Lindsey Corporation (and certain 
of its executives) were found guilty by a federal jury of conspiracy to violate 
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vate bribery actions are filed concurrently with FCPA investi-
gations, corporations are likely to use the same cost-benefit, 
settlement-minded analysis when deciding whether to contest a 
Travel Act indictment as they do for FCPA indictments.  
Because the Travel Act exists as an option to pursue pri-
vate foreign bribery in the United States does not make it the 
best or most efficient method to eradicate bribery. The Travel 
Act’s reliance on various state laws, its piecemeal approach, 
and its unfamiliarity to businesses make it a less than ideal 
choice for foreign private bribery actions. To compensate for 
times when the Travel Act is inapplicable as an FCPA supple-
ment, the DOJ looks to the mail and wire fraud statutes to 
prosecute acts of foreign private-sector bribery. 
2. Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes 
Mail and wire fraud statutes are usually applicable to cas-
es of foreign-commercial bribery because businesses rely on in-
terstate or international mail and wire communications in most 
of their daily transactions.152 However, despite the seeming 
ease of attaching a mail and wire fraud action to an FCPA in-
dictment, these statutes face difficulties in effectively prosecut-
ing private-sector bribery. First, although the honest services 
law was created to add clarity to the mail and wire fraud stat-
utes’ scope, courts and many attorneys still find 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1346 unconstitutionally broad.153 Additionally, the Supreme 
Court’s limiting of § 1346 to only bribery and kickback 
schemes154
As a first hurdle, a number of circuits have found that ad-
ditional layers of analysis are required when pursuing an hon-
est services claim in a mail or wire fraud action.
 has created additional questions as to its allowance 
in purely private-sector situations. 
155 When the 
Supreme Court attempted to limit § 1346 in Skilling v. United 
States, it also emphasized the need to refer to “pre-McNally 
cases,” which were tied to breaches of fiduciary duty.156
 
the FCPA and substantive FCPA violations.”). 
 The 
 152. WEBB ET AL., supra note 96, § 2.03, 2-16. 
 153. See DOYLE, supra note 100, at 10 (discussing a generally recognized 
need to limit the scope of § 1346).  
 154. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2907 (2010). 
 155. See DOYLE, supra note 100, at 10–11.  
 156. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2905; Charion L. Vaughn, Note, Power Cor-
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idea of a fiduciary duty in a public company is clear, but the 
corresponding role of fiduciary duties of purely private actors, 
where the only victim is a private company, still remains under 
debate as Skilling declined to define how or when such fiduci-
ary duties arise.157 As such, the First, Fourth, Seventh, and 
Ninth Circuits have found that for a violation of the honest ser-
vices statute to constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, there 
must also be a “‘recognizable scheme formed with intent to de-
fraud.’”158 In fact, the Seventh Circuit would go so far as to re-
quire defendants to aim for a personal private gain before rec-
ognizing a violation of the honest services statute.159 
Conversely, the Fifth Circuit, and to some extent the Third and 
Eighth Circuits, require a state law violation before allowing a 
honest services charge to continue.160 This attempt to limit 
§ 1346’s reach is due to federalism concerns and creates an ad-
ditional required layer of inquiry for the federal government be-
fore it can pursue private bribery charges under the mail or 
wire fraud statutes.161
This confusion as to whether a mail or wire fraud action 
requires demonstrating personal gain by defendants or an ini-
tial state law violation adds additional obstacles to bringing 
federal private bribery charges. Such additional analysis 
wastes resources which could be more effectively utilized in 
pursuing or investigating additional instances of private-sector 
foreign bribery. As the Supreme Court has not clearly described 
the requirements for § 1346 actions in private bribery instanc-
es, the DOJ should not have to wait for additional clarification 
by Congress or the Supreme Court before pursuing such ac-
tions. The FCPA was a “game changer” for foreign public brib-
ery prosecutions and the DOJ should have an equally strong 
and clear law to prosecute acts of foreign private bribery. 
  
 
rupts: Honest Services Fraud and Fiduciary Duties, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 713, 
726 (2011).  
 157. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2936–37; Steven Wisotsky, Honest Services 
Fraud after Skilling v. United States, FEDERALIST SOC’Y FOR L. & PUB. POL’Y 
STUDIES (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/honest 
-services-fraud-after-skilling-v-united-states. 
 158. See Vaughn, supra note 156, at 719 (quoting United States v. 
Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 1980)). 
 159. See DOYLE, supra note 100, at 11. 
 160. See Vaughn, supra note 156, at 719–20. 
 161. Id. at 721. 
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3. Self-Regulation by Companies 
As opposed to creating new, or supplementing existing 
bribery statutes, some scholars and business insiders believe 
the best method to eliminate private international commercial 
bribery is through self-regulation by the companies them-
selves.162 The argument follows that companies are “much more 
efficient” at protecting and monitoring their own interests.163 
These critics also generally find that fiduciary relationships are 
already monitored in the United States, mainly through share-
holder class actions and derivative litigation,164 making the ad-
dition of a criminal penalty on top of this pre-existing avenue 
for recovery superfluous.165
Most agree that leaving some regulation of private bribery 
to corporations positively contributes to its eradication. “Corpo-
rations who are keenly aware of the deleterious effects of cor-
ruption have established ethics codes and conduct training pro-
grams to make the employees aware of the standards of 
behavior expected within the organization.”
 
166 This has led 
some companies to create polices about receiving non-monetary 
gifts and benefits—“such as tickets, trips, meals, favors, etc.”167 
However, the existence of a company code of ethics or anti-
bribery management attitude does not guarantee that a com-
pany’s employees will always behave as instructed, “whether 
out of ignorance or because their personal interests lie else-
where, or because the actual culture of the company is at odds 
with its declared aims.”168 And in fact, press reports suggest 
that private corruption in companies that claim to self-regulate 
continues to exist.169
 
 162. See Argandoña, supra note 
 
9, at 259–63 (providing suggestions for 
companies looking to protect themselves from corruption). 
 163. Id. at 253. 
 164. See id. at 258–59 (stating that penalties for private-to-private corrup-
tion are based on fiduciary relationships and civil laws that provide for dam-
ages). 
 165. Cf. id. (discussing the limited results of criminal corruption legislation 
and the preference for civil law remedies). 
 166. Gopinath, supra note 22, at 749. 
 167. See id. 
 168. Argandoña, supra note 9, at 259. 
 169. See Gopinath, supra note 22, at 749. 
  
2013] PRIVATE-SECTOR BRIBERY 2311 
 
The self-regulatory model, especially in an international 
context, fails as a stand-alone method. Self-regulation is prem-
ised on “self-policing with regulatory oversight,” as government 
enforcement creates a baseline of “normative ethical principles” 
against which companies could structure their internal over-
sight and provides tangible consequences of non-compliance.170 
Without effective statutory enforcement of self-regulation, cor-
porate compliance plans can become “little more than a protec-
tive measure designed to feign voluntary compliance under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines in the unlikely event that a 
company gets caught . . . .”171
Additionally, in the context of globalization, creating a 
credible internal oversight program that is applicable and en-
forceable in every country is extremely difficult.
  
172 “Cultural 
mores in each country provide differing views about the legiti-
macy of bribery as a market behavior in the first instance.”173 
Also, these corporate compliance programs can lose effective-
ness with increased organizational distances and when in coun-
tries with decreased regulatory presence.174
Although self-regulation by companies is a positive tech-
nique that encourages companies to take a more proactive role 
in eliminating bribery, it cannot function as a stand-alone 
method to eradicate private bribery. As such, the only practical 
solution to handle private-sector bribery is through increased 
governmental enforcement in combination with existing inter-
nal policing measures.
  
175 The U.K. Bribery Act has attempted to 
combines both private and public-sector bribery regulation and 
incentives for companies who attempt to self-regulate in a sin-
gle statute.176
B. U.K. BRIBERY ACT 
  
Stepping away from the United States’s piecemeal ap-
proach to prosecuting all forms of bribery, the U.K. Bribery Act 
 
 170. See Weismann, supra note 35, at 625–26. 
 171. Id. at 616. 
 172. See id. at 626.  
 173. Id. 
 174. See id. at 627. 
 175. See id. at 628.  
 176. See Pulina Whitaker, The UK Bribery Act: Be Prepared, 41 LAWYER’S 
BRIEF, Aug. 31, 2011, at 2. 
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was created to cover both public officials and private citizens 
and specifically criminalize private-sector bribery.177 The guid-
ance to Section 1 of the U.K. Bribery Act is explicit that any use 
of the term “person” is intentionally broad, so as to include both 
public and private-sectors.178 In rejecting the notion that pri-
vate-sector bribery deserves less attention than public-sector, 
the U.K. Bribery Act earned the nickname: the “FCPA on ster-
oids.”179
Despite its succinctness and broad applicability in address-
ing all forms of bribery, the U.K. Bribery Act is relatively un-
tested and faces its own critics. For instance, the U.K. Bribery 
Act has faced criticism for including an affirmative defense for 
companies that have “adequate procedures.”
 
180 Section 7 of the 
U.K. Bribery Act assigns liability to businesses that fail to pre-
vent bribery within their organizations, regardless of whether 
the bribe is to a private organization or a public official.181 How-
ever, under the “adequate procedures” defense, corporations 
that can demonstrate they have acceptable safeguards in place 
can avoid liability.182 It has also faced criticisms for ambiguity, 
overreach, and even for being too difficult to execute and dra-
conian in nature.183
Despite these and other criticisms, the U.K. Bribery Act’s 
inclusion of all types of bribery within one statute is an im-
portant new way to allow for governmental regulation of for-
eign private-sector bribery. Any potential later issues, such as 
 
 
 177. See id. Also, unlike the FCPA, the U.K. Bribery Act has no defense for 
facilitation payments, has a provision making it an offense for corporations to 
fail to prevent bribery, and does not require proof of “corrupt” intention. Id. 
 178. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 124, at 9 n.3. 
 179. See Johannes Scholtes, The UK Bribery Act, “FCPA on Steroids,” AIIM 
EXPERT BLOG (Sept. 12, 2011, 4:46 AM), http://www.aiim.org/ 
community/blogs/expert/The-UK-Bribery-Act-e2809cFCPA-on-steroidse2809d. 
 180. Cf. Engle, supra note 120, at 1173 (discussing the adequate proce-
dures defense and criticisms of the Act’s “ambiguity”). 
 181. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 124, at 15. 
 182. See Warin et al., supra note 122, at 30–31. 
 183. See Engle, supra note 120, at 1173; George Rosenberg, New UK Brib-
ery Act 2010—Draconian in Theory but Is It Enforceable in Practice?, 5 CON-
STRUCTION L. INT’L 19, 24 (2010); Maria Caspani, Interview—UK Bribery Act 
Likely to End Up as “A Farce”—British Peer, TRUSTLAW (Oct. 29, 2012, 12:04 
PM), http://m.trust.org/trustlaw/news/interview-uk-bribery-act-likely-to-end-
up-as-a-farce-british-peer/ (noting the lack of prosecutions under the U.K. 
Bribery Act). 
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disputes on the vagueness of terms in the U.K. Bribery Act, 
which is a frequent critique of the FCPA, are easily correctable 
either through the development of U.K. Bribery Act case law or 
by turning to the terms’ definitions in literature and case law 
on corporate governance.184 Any concerns about the “draconian” 
and all-encompassing nature of the U.K. Bribery Act will likely 
be corrected or avoided with continued use of the U.K. Bribery 
Act, as evidenced by the Minister of Justice’s explanation that 
“the ultimate aim of [the Bribery Act] is to make life difficult 
for the minority of organizations responsible for corruption, not 
to burden the vast majority of decent and law-abiding busi-
nesses.”185 Despite its criticisms, the U.K. Bribery Act is an im-
portant attempt to raise international standards of bribery 
regulation and to force corporations to institute internal con-
trols to prevent bribery.186
III.  AMENDING THE FCPA TO INCLUDE A PROVISION 
BANNING INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE-SECTOR BRIBERY   
 
The United States currently uses a number of methods to 
prosecute those who commit private-sector bribery. Although 
each method helps to eliminate acts of bribery, none are able to 
fully accomplish DOJ goals on an individual basis. To truly en-
sure that the United States remains a world leader in working 
to eradicate both public and private-sector bribery, other “after 
the fact” methods to prosecute private-sector bribery must be 
replaced with an amended FCPA that criminalizes all forms of 
foreign bribery. 
A. AMENDING THE FCPA TO INCLUDE A PRIVATE-SECTOR 
BRIBERY COMPONENT 
The addition of a private-sector bribery component to the 
FCPA is the ideal method to ensure that the United States re-
mains a leader in eliminating foreign bribery. The DOJ’s cur-
rent techniques, including tag-along Travel Act actions and 
mail and wire fraud statute prosecutions, require additional 
 
 184. See Engle, supra note 120, at 1185. 
 185. Robert Amaee, Robert Amaee on U.K. Bribery Act Guidance, FCPA 
PROFESSOR (Mar. 31, 2011, 12:08 AM), http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2011/ 
03/robert-amaee-on-uk-bribery-act-guidance.html (quoting U.K. Minister of 
Justice Kenneth Clarke). 
 186. See Engle, supra note 120, at 1188. 
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hurdles that squander crucial resources from the more im-
portant discovery and investigation of new instances of private-
sector bribery. Additionally, without a foreign private-sector 
bribery component in the FCPA, the DOJ misses the opportuni-
ty to use the full weight, power, and threat of FCPA actions to 
deter acts of private-sector bribery by companies. If both public 
and private-sector bribery were contained within a single stat-
ute, similar to the U.K. Bribery Act, prosecutors could avoid te-
dious and confusing prosecutions while increasing awareness of 
the illegality of private-sector bribery. 
Fortunately for the United States, amending the FCPA to 
include a provision on private bribery does not require rein-
venting the wheel. First, definitions of private commercial brib-
ery, or general bribery, can be found in twenty-nine state stat-
ute books.187 Currently, the FCPA is explicit in defining public-
sector bribery as an entity separate from other forms of brib-
ery.188 If Congress preferred to keep the statute’s language in 
its current form, it could easily add a separate definition for 
commercial bribery and leave other sections untouched. Con-
versely, the amendment could borrow the spirit, if not the 
wording, of the U.K. Bribery Act.189 The U.K. Bribery Act 
makes no distinction between public and private-sector brib-
ery.190
However, in its current form, the FCPA is much more 
amenable to the addition of private bribery language, as op-
posed to the modification of existing language. Each section of 
the FCPA denotes ways a party might violate the FCPA.
 Taking this route, Congress would need to restructure 
the definition of bribery in the FCPA to expand its breadth, and 
hopefully, simplicity. As such, Congress has dual alternatives 
for amending the FCPA to include a foreign private-sector com-
ponent; Congress could either (1) eliminate all references to the 
“public” nature of the bribery, or (2) add a new section to the 
FCPA that specifically refers to commercial bribery. Either op-
tion would guarantee that private-sector bribery becomes a 
significant part of the FCPA. 
191
 
 187. See Rupp & Fink, supra note 
 As 
76, at 2. 
 188. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1)–(3) (2006). 
 189. See generally Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 1 (defining bribery). 
 190. Id. 
 191. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1)–(3). 
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opposed to changing this oft-referenced definition, Congress 
could add a provision that additionally bars the use of commer-
cial bribery to garner unfair business advantages. This change 
would ensure that each reference in the FCPA to the definition 
of “bribery” would also include reference to bribes of private ac-
tors. Borrowing language from both the FCPA and the U.K. 
Bribery Act, an example to the changes to each section of the 
FCPA could read as such: 
(a) Prohibition 
It shall be unlawful for any person other than an issuer that is sub-
ject to section 78dd-1 of this title or a domestic concern (as defined 
in section 78dd-2 of this title), or for any person, officer, director, em-
ployee, or agent of such person or any stockholder thereof acting on 
behalf of such person, while in the territory of the United States, cor-
ruptly to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of in-
terstate commerce or to do any other act in furtherance of an offer, 
payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any 
money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of 
anything of value to— 
(4) any person, officer, director, employee, or agent of such person for 
purposes of— 
(A)(i) inducing a person to perform improperly a relevant function 
or activity, or (ii) to reward a person for the improper performance 
of such a function or activity. 
The disadvantage to only amending existing FCPA lan-
guage is that it would be difficult to account for those who ac-
cept bribes, as opposed to only those who make bribes, as done 
in the U.K. Bribery Act.192
B. ADDITION OF A PRIVATE-SECTOR COMPONENT IS CONSISTENT 
WITH CURRENT DOJ GOALS 
 Currently, this group is entirely ex-
cluded from FCPA prosecution. However, this suggested “quick-
fix” of FCPA language would avoid the arduous task of revising 
existing FCPA language and would take great strides in expo-
nentially expanding the breadth of FCPA bribery actions until 
the appropriate time to undertake a complete overhaul of the 
FCPA.  
According to a statement by Assistant Attorney General 
Greg Andres, the “investigation and prosecution of transna-
tional bribery is an important priority for the Department of 
Justice.”193
 
 192. See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 2. 
 He followed by noting that “bribery in international 
 193. Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing 
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business transactions weakens economic development; it un-
dermines confidence in the marketplace; and it distorts compe-
tition.”194
As of September 2011, there was an estimated thirty-three 
resolved FCPA enforcement actions for the year, behind 2010’s 
record of seventy-four resolved FCPA actions.
 This mindset demonstrates the government’s recogni-
tion of international bribery as a great harm, and though he 
was referring to public-sector bribery, his words could easily 
apply to the harms of private-sector bribery as well.  
195 Although 
FCPA prosecutions also fell during 2012, the decline is likely 
attributable to the lengthy “trench warfare” necessary to take a 
successful FCPA action to trial.196 In line with still sizable 
numbers of FCPA indictments, the number of tag-along Travel 
Act actions that prosecute private bribery is also increasing.197 
Recognizing the immense harm that bribery can cause through 
the “diversion of resources, the distortion of free markets and 
damage to society,”198
The FCPA was passed after Congress’s realization that 
foreign bribery was a legitimate threat to both the payer and 
the recipient of bribes.
 the DOJ must encourage Congress to 
amend the FCPA to include international private-sector brib-
ery.  
199
 
Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. 4 (2010) (statement of Greg Andres, Acting Deputy Assistant 
Att’y Gen., Criminal Division, Dep’t of Justice). 
 However, the DOJ’s inability to effi-
ciently prosecute all forms of bribery under the FCPA hampers 
this original goal and highlights the necessity for a new FCPA 
that can prosecute both public-sector and private-to-private 
bribery. This amendment would ensure that the FCPA is in full 
 194. Id. at 4–5. 
 195. Benjamin D. Klein et al., DOJ and SEC Affirm Continued Commit-
ment to Rigorous FCPA Enforcement, MORGAN LEWIS (Nov. 14, 2011), http:// 
www.morganlewis.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publication.print/publicationID/3e
a3637d-4eb4-49c1-aaef-53ac7fb6bcf9/. 
 196. See 2012 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 2, 2013), http:// 
www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/2012YearEndFCPAUpdate.aspx 
(noting that “vast government resources [were] poured into the comprehensive 
FCPA Resource Guide” in 2012). 
 197. See Cassin, supra note 75 (finding that prior to 2005, the Travel Act 
was only used in a handful of cases to prosecute private bribery). 
 198. JOINT COMM. ON THE DRAFT BRIBERY BILL, FIRST REPORT OF SESSION 
2008–09, 2008–09, H.L. 115-I, H.C. 430-I, at 8.  
 199. See Weismann, supra note 35, at 617. 
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compliance with Congress’s wishes to eliminate the potential 
harms caused by bribery to all parties and society at large. De-
spite the DOJ’s inability to prosecute bribery under one, clear 
statute, it is a sign of progress that private-sector international 
bribery is becoming more recognized. With the increased recog-
nition of private-sector bribery as a credible threat, the next 
step must be strong legislation that enables clarity in the law 
and eradicates foreign private-sector bribery. 
C. THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT CLIMATE IS IDEAL FOR AN 
AMENDMENT TO THE FCPA 
Now is the ideal time to add an international private-sector 
bribery component to the FCPA. On June 14, 2011, the House 
Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Securities (Subcommittee) listened to arguments on 
whether the FCPA needed amending.200 Faced with calls from 
groups that the FCPA is too vague and damages American 
business competitiveness abroad, the Subcommittee considered 
proposals by the Chamber of Commerce, including: adding a 
compliance defense to FCPA actions, limiting a company’s lia-
bility for actions of acquired companies and for its subsidiaries, 
adding a “willfulness” requirement for corporate liability, and 
clearly defining “foreign official” under the statute.201 Following 
such review, in 2012, the DOJ released new guidance on the 
FCPA to help quell such concerns,202 but critics still argue that 
the FCPA could use revision to increase its clarity and trans-
parency.203
Critics concerned with vagueness might find that the addi-
tion of more terms to the FCPA would only increase its some-
times confusing and overbroad nature. As noted, many are at-
tempting to work for specific, clear definitions to be included in 
 
 
 200. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
112th Cong. (2011). 
 201. See id. at 19–20 (statement of Hon. Michael Mukasey). 
 202. See FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 27. 
 203. Mike Koehler, Former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales Criticizes 
Various Aspects of DOJ FCPA Enforcement, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 4, 2013), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/former-attorney-general-alberto-gonzales 
-criticizes-various-aspects-of-doj-fcpa-enforcement (noting former Attorney 
General Alberto Gonzales’s discontent with the slow pace of FCPA reform). 
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the FCPA. However, the addition of the public-sector compo-
nent has the potential to reduce such criticized ambiguities. In 
line with the U.K. Bribery Act, if the terms were specific to in-
clude all “persons,” this would negate questions as to who is al-
lowed to accept a bribe. By encompassing all forms of bribery in 
the FCPA, a need for a distinction between private companies 
and public officials would vanish.  
The recently released FCPA Guidance by the DOJ shows 
that Congress and the executive branch are amenable to listen-
ing to calls for change to the FCPA and that now is the ideal 
time to ask Congress to also consider bringing the FCPA in line 
with new international norms by adding a private-sector brib-
ery component. 
  CONCLUSION   
Private-sector bribery regulation is not a new idea, but it is 
novel for the United States to directly incorporate such regula-
tion in the FCPA. Both domestically and internationally, states 
and countries have recognized the corrosive effect of allowing 
businesses to unfairly compete and pay bribes, whether such 
bribe is to a government official or any other person in interna-
tional business. Such actions disadvantage newcomers, compet-
itors, and hurt industries, as well as the countries in which 
they reside. The United States has already begun to follow the 
trend of other countries to prosecute transnational private-
sector bribery through the use of pre-existing statutes that 
were not originally intended to handle such crimes. Unsurpris-
ingly, the use of statutes such as the Travel Act and the mail 
and wire fraud statutes are inadequate solutions for the inter-
national goal of eradicating private-sector bribery. 
The United Kingdom had experienced issues similar to the 
United States in the application of its existing bribery laws. 
Without amendment, the British bribery laws did not meet the 
standards of the international community and were vague and 
difficult to apply. By renovating its entire bribery regulatory 
system, the United Kingdom not only joined the United States 
as a leader in prosecuting public and private-sector bribery, but 
surpassed it in breadth. The FCPA does not need to be entirely 
rewritten, but as a statute originally passed by Congress in 
1977, it must be updated to coincide with modern trends in 
prosecuting international private-sector bribery. An addition of 
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a commercial bribery component to the FCPA will ensure that 
the United States is not surpassed by other nations as a leader 
in fighting international bribery and will demonstrate its con-
tinuing dedication to championing fair and honest internation-
al business practices. 
